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Advances and research in biotechnology have applications over a wide range of areas,
such as microbiology, medicine, the food industry, agriculture, genetically modified organ-
isms, and nanotechnology, among others. However, research with pathogenic agents,
such as virus, parasites, fungi, rickettsia, bacterial microorganisms, or genetic modified
organisms, has generated concern because of their potential biological risk – not only
for people, but also for the environment due to their unpredictable behavior. In addition,
concern for biosafety is associated with the emergence of new diseases or re-emergence
of diseases that were already under control. Biotechnology laboratories require biosafety
measures designed to protect their staff, the population, and the environment, which
may be exposed to hazardous organisms and materials. Laboratory staff training and
education is essential, not only to acquire a good understanding about the direct handling
of hazardous biological agents but also knowledge of the epidemiology, pathogenicity,
and human susceptibility to the biological materials used in research. Biological risk can be
reduced and controlled by the correct application of internationally recognized procedures
such as proper microbiological techniques, proper containment apparatus, adequate
facilities, protective barriers, and special training and education of laboratory workers. To
avoid occupational infections, knowledge about standardized microbiological procedures
and techniques and the use of containment devices, facilities, and protective barriers is
necessary. Training and education about the epidemiology, pathogenicity, and biohazards
of the microorganisms involved may prevent or decrease the risk. In this way, the
scientific community may benefit from the lessons learned in the past to anticipate future
problems.
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Introduction
Health biotechnology and bioengineering have recently undergone major advances in both human
and animal medicine. They involve the study and manipulation of modified living organisms,
genetically modified organisms (GMOs), transgenic plants, animals or microorganisms, and the
production of vaccines carried out in special laboratories with different biosafety and biosecurity
levels according to the pathogenicity of the organisms under study (Mattiasson, 2013) Since
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microorganisms and GMOsmay be harmful or pathogenic to ani-
mals and humans, the possibility of enhanced virulence through
genetic manipulation or increased drug-resistance, among other
routes, implies putting specific biosafety and biosecurity proce-
dures in place. To guarantee public health, every possible scenario
of an outbreak arising through the release of a bio-hazard into the
environment cannot be neglected (Nordmann, 2010).
Biosecurity includes a set of preventive measures that vary
according to the organisms which are under study. Biosafety
and biosecurity are terms which are frequently referred to with
similar meanings in the literature. While the differences between
the two concepts have been specified academically, in practice,
when one is actually working hands-on in a laboratory it is more
difficult to draw such distinctions as referred by Daoust-Maleval
(2011). Moreover, Bakanidze et al. (2010) indicates that concepts
of biosafety and biosecurity include several control measures that
may overlap each other. To avoid misunderstanding, biosafety
includes all the preventionmeasures carried out to avoid the infec-
tion with pathogenic organisms and/or toxins and their release to
the environment (OMS). In the other hand, biosecurity is referred
to all the preventive measures to avoid or reduce the risk of trans-
mission of infectious diseases in crops and livestock, quarantined
pests, or GMOs (Baltz et al., 2010). The objective of this review
is to highlight the main risks associated with biological investi-
gation in laboratory, the potential laboratory-acquired infections
(LAIs) by laboratory personnel, and suggested recommendations
to avoid them.
Biotechnology in Health and Biosafety
Advances and research in biotechnology have applications over
a wide range of areas, such as microbiology, medicine, the food
industry, waste management, agriculture, GMOs, and nanotech-
nology, among others (Thompson, 2007; Baltz et al., 2010; Bennett
et al., 2013).
Biosafety cuts across different human and veterinary science.
The first infectious diseases acquired in a laboratorywere reported
at the time of Pasteur and Koch in 1890. However, several decades
passed before the connection between human diseases and the
handling of pathogenic microorganisms was understood (Sulkin,
1961; Traxler et al., 2013), and the implementation of protective
measures against biological risks in humans was reported in the
literature (Sulkin, 1961; Pike, 1978; Collins and Kennedy, 1998).
The first safety measures in microbiology laboratories that work
with pathogenic microorganisms were implemented in North
America and the United Kingdom at the beginning of the 1970s.
These measures included laboratory training and education about
the correct use of personal protective equipment and physical
containment measures designed to limit the potential spread of
biological agents (Frommer et al., 1989). After that, safety mea-
sures were applied in laboratories that work with GMOs. One
of the most important considerations in the development and
application of biotechnology is the maintenance of both biosafety
and biosecurity measures at high levels. The Cartagena Protocol
on Biosafety is an international regulation of the use of GMOs
resulting from modern biotechnology. This agreement, which
focuses specifically on the transboundary movement of GMOs,
promotes biosecurity by establishing rules and procedures for the
safe transfer, handling, and use of GMOs (McKenzie and Ascen-
cio, 2003). Since biotechnology could be a potential threat to the
population, the Biological Weapons Convention – a multilateral
disarmament treaty focused on the prohibition of biological and
toxinsweapons (Millett, 2006; Bakanidze et al., 2010) – recognized
the application of biosafety and biosecurity measures as tools to
prevent the development, acquisition, or use of biological and/or
toxins weapons. Biotechnology investigations have developed a
wide range of powerful tools and processes to improve human and
animal health. Good laboratory practices regarding biosafety and
bioethics are essential measures to avoiding LAIs. Some publica-
tions have evaluated the effectiveness of biosafety and biosecurity
measures in traditional laboratories (Kimman et al., 2008; Nasim
et al., 2010). Monitoring laboratory infections is one of the most
important methods of evaluating the effectiveness of containment
measures (McLean et al., 2002).
Biological Risk Classification
Pathogenic microorganisms represent only a small proportion of
the biological hazards of concern in laboratory investigations.
Their control importance is based on their potential threat to
humans, animal populations, and also agriculture. In addition,
they can be responsible for large-scale infections with huge eco-
nomic costs and environmental consequences (Bosia, 2008).
In addition, new viruses are constantly emerging that threaten
the lives of humans and animals. All laboratory staff who work
with biological samples are exposed to a number of infectious
materials and subject to risk from clinical specimens and cultures.
Since hazardous agents can be transmitted in the laboratory by
inhalation, inoculation, or through the skin, among others, it
is necessary to know the characteristics of the agents in study
according to their risk to the health of laboratory staff, and to
the human and animal population in case of an outbreak (Corrao
et al., 2012).
The World Health Organization (WHO) developed a system
to classify microorganisms based on their danger to laboratory
staff and the public (World Health Organization (WHO), 2004).
Biological agents of risk group 1 include those unlikely to cause
disease inman, biological agents of risk group 2 include those that
can cause disease in humans and pose a danger for workers with
little chance of spreading among them or to the community. In
addition, there is prophylaxis and effective treatment available to
the community. Biological agents of risk group 3 include those that
can cause serious illness in humans, represent a serious danger to
workers with risk of spreading to the community, and there is an
effective treatment or prophylaxis. Finally, the biological agents of
risk group 4 include those that can cause severe disease in humans
and represent a serious danger toworkers, with likelihood of being
spread to the community and there is usually no effective prophy-
laxis or treatment (World Health Organization (WHO), 2004).
However, there are other biological risk classifications by coun-
try, based mainly on national policies. In the European Union,
Directive 2000/54/EC (2000) on the protection of workers from
risks through exposure to biological agents, the agents are classi-
fied into four risk groups based on the risk level of infection. In the
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United States, biological hazards are also classified into four risk
groups, from minimal hazard (risk group 1) to those responsible
for very serious diseases (risk group 4), as described by theCenters
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) (Center for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), 2009). In other countries such as
Canada orAustralia, pathogenic agents are also classified into four
risk groups (NZS, 2002; PHAC, 2013).
Taking into account the pathogenic effects to humans and
the potential danger to the environment, the classification of
pathogenic agents as well as their containment measures should
be undertaken with a single goal: to reduce all potential risks
(Kimman et al., 2008). Moreover, investigation with infected
transgenic animals that carry the genes of an infectious agentmust
be subjected to a proper risk evaluation and also subject to correct
handling with specialized containment facilities and equipment.
The specialized containment can address the risks of aerosolized
particles, such as in studies of tuberculosis or lymphocytic chori-
omeningitis, and animals such as poultry infected with influenza
(World Health Organization (WHO), 2004; OIE, 2012; Shinnick
and Gilpin, 2012).
Biological Risks to Health in Biotechnology
Laboratories
There are many biological risks in health biotechnology, such
as bacteria, viruses, rickettsiae, fungi, and parasites (Liberman
et al., 1990; World Health Organization (WHO), 2004). Regard-
ing biosafety and biosecurity in biomedical laboratories, there is
great concern about new vaccines, diagnostic tools, or therapeutic
agents, some of which aremade by genetic engineering (Doblhoff-
Dier and Collins, 2001). Currently, a main concern of biosafety
is due to the emergence of new diseases or the re-emergence of
diseases that were already under control (Brown, 2004; Jones et al.,
2008). In laboratories, there are many tasks that involve numerous
risks to the laboratory staff. Thus, any incident associated with a
given microbiological hazard is probably most likely to happen in
a microbiology laboratory. However, incidents are not associated
to a single factor but the interaction of several of them (Sewell,
1995; Kozajda and Szadkowska-Stanczyk, 2010).
In the near future, advances in microbiology associated with
biotechnology will increase the knowledge of viroids, viruses, and
bacteria cells that carry novel genetic material, which has been
modified or constructed through genetic engineering. Thus, new
concerns in biosecurity and environmental health will emerge.
Currently, there is an urgent demand for new vaccines against
extremely hazardous pathogens such as Ebola (Levine et al.,
2014). The research will involve the manipulation of pathogenic
microorganisms that could have harmful effects on public health
and the environment. To guarantee the biosafety of laboratory
staff and the biosecuritymeasures of the facilities, the intrinsic and
potentially harmful characteristics of all microorganisms under
study must be identified.
Although research in biotechnology is necessary, nowadays
there is a dilemma about the freedom or limitation of these
investigations. Thus, gain-of-function (GOF) research or dual use
research (DUR) have arisen as an important concern, not only
among the scientific community but also among the population
(Casadevall and Imperiale, 2014). While GOF is associated with
the acquirement of a new activity or the enhancement, a previ-
ous function, DUR, is associated with a misuse of science (Suk
et al., 2011; Duprex et al., 2015). Research with highly pathogenic
microorganisms, like H5N1 influenza, anthrax among others,
could derive into a serious biological threat to a population or
even terrorism (Resnik, 2010; Lipkin, 2012). Epidemics of pan-
demic proportions or improved previous research to develop bio
weapons could be an uncontrollable risk for a population. As a
result, both GOF research andDURmust be regulated with strong
biosafety measures, restricted research, and specific policy as was
recently discussed in Germany (Karberg, 2014).
Vectors used in Gene Therapy
Gene therapy, in vivo and ex vivo, use vectors classified as viral
or non-viral, which express the gene or genes of therapeutic
interest. Non-viral vectors include liposomes, naked DNA, and
DNA-protein complexes (Doblhoff-Dier andCollins, 2001), while
viral vectors derived from viruses that are attenuated in order to
prevent destructive infection in target tissues. Non-viral vectors
are preferred from the biosafety point-of-view, although they are
less efficient than viral. Thus, viral vectors are usually used to avoid
this disadvantage. The expression of the information encoded
in genes leads to functional modification of infected cells, and
the evaluation of these modifications are extremely complex and
incomplete when the modified cells belong to the host. The safety
of gene therapy vectors has been the focus of regulatory attention
by committees. They are required to assess the proportionality
between the magnitude of the risks and potential therapeutic
benefits, as well as to monitor the occurrence of risks in the
experiment once they have been approved (Verma and Somia,
1997). Biosafety in laboratories with gene therapy manufacture
must consider the staff and the patients that may be in contact. In
addition, a comprehensive risk assessment of viral vectorsmust be
carried out.
Ideally, viral vectors should be designed only to act as trans-
porters of the exogenous genetic material to avoid the develop-
ment of new replicative viral particles in transduced cells. Thus,
it is understood that a viral vector cannot make any escape or
reversion in virulent forms. The biohazard of these vectors is
determined by their own biological risk to the laboratory staff, by
the environment of the exogenous genes they carry and also by
the tropism of the recombinant virus (Doblhoff-Dier and Collins,
2001).
Gene therapy, due to its technical and ethical characteristics,
is regulated by law. In the United States, the National Institutes of
Health (1999) and the Food andDrugAdministration (1998) pub-
lished several guides to describe the main biosecurity measures
with which all laboratories must comply.
Utilization of retroviral vectors must be subjected to a previous
risk assessment. Since they are highly infectious and may infect
and propagate themselves in human cells, they may be considered
as an important biohazard to the laboratory staff (Thomas et al.,
2003; Anson, 2004).
The principal biosafety concern when working with retro-
viruses is the chance of viruses entering the cells and tissues of lab-
oratory personnel through skin lesions or by accident. The closer
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the contact the greater the risk, because retroviral particles are
extremely labile and short-lived. Even when using defective retro-
viruses that present a lower risk of infection, laboratory staff must
be trained in virology and tissue culture (Le Duc et al., 2008).
Handling of animals infected with retroviruses, especially those
that present a potential human cell risk, need high standards of
biosecurity measures, particularly for avoiding potential animal
escape and the spread of infection. Additionally, when handling
infected animals extreme caution must be taken to avoid injuries
through bites, clawing, or scratches. Laboratory staff should only
be allowed to handle infected animals if they have specific training
and always under the supervision of a senior (Wolfensohn and
Lloyd, 2013).
Regarding gene therapy, immunomodulation has arisen as
a new trend in biotechnology. It can be defined as therapeu-
tic procedures aimed at modifying the immune response (Gea-
Banacloche, 2006). Research in immunomodulation is focused
on correcting specific diseases or immuno-deficiencies such
as HIV, cancer, allergies, or inflammatory diseases among
others. It consists in the hybridization of synthetic genetic
sequence in the organisms targeted to express or suppress spe-
cific genes in the host. Several oligonucleotides based on DNA
or RNA has been used, vaccination being the most effective
immunomodulatory technique (Gea-Banacloche, 2006). How-
ever, the potential biological risk of immunomodulation is asso-
ciated with the uncertain hybridization and gene expression in
the host, which may cause an adverse effect (Vo et al., 2006).
Thus, the main biosafety concern in the laboratory is associ-
ated with accidental needlesticks that can cause unpredictable
responses in an organism. However, the utilization of oligonu-
cleotides sequences of RNAi or siRNA increases the control
of the gene expression (Behlke, 2006), and further research is
necessary.
Vaccines
The manufacture of vaccines based on viral or bacterial recom-
binants are the most common approaches to live GMO vaccines,
and are sources of biological risk in biotechnology laboratories.
Several pathogens, including bacteria like Lactococcus lactis or
Salmonella Typhymurium have been used in the manufacture
of recombinant vaccines (Robinson et al., 1997; Gomez-Duarte
et al., 1998). Recombinant viral vaccines are manufactured from
poxvirus, paramixovirus, adenovirus, or vaccinia virus, among
others (Rotz et al., 2001). The large-scale manufacture of vac-
cines, as well as other biological products, should be considered
as a potential occupational risk factor. Thus, the training and
education of workers engaged in vaccine manufacture must be
a priority (Doblhoff-Dier and Collins, 2001). There are some
biosafety guidelines about manufacture of recombinant vaccines,
laboratory procedures, exposure of laboratory staff, or advice
about outbreak, among others (Doblhoff-Dier and Collins, 2001;
World Health Organization (WHO), 2004). For the most part,
viral vectors for vaccine development have similar biosafety risks
as gene therapy viruses, as we previously described. The major
differences in risk are associated with the antigens or immune
enhancing components of the vaccine and challenge experiments
(Vemula and Mittal, 2010).
Xenotransplantation
Another possible biohazard in biotechnology is associated with
xenotransplantation. This term includes any procedure that
involves the transplantation, implantation, or infusion of human
cells, tissues, or organs from non-human animals (Yang and
Sykes, 2007). Nowadays, biotechnology companies develop genet-
ically engineered pigs to meet the demand for organs, which
are compatible with humans. Transgenic pigs have been adopted
as organ donors rather than primates, because of ethical objec-
tions to the use of primates (Lambrigts et al., 1998). Moreover,
almost all primate species are protected. Since xenotransplanta-
tion may imply a potential zoonotical risk, donor animals must
not carry any potential zoonotical disease, with special care for
immunosuppressed patients (Michaels et al., 1994). Potential
virus infections associated with xenotransplantation have been
widely discussed by the scientific community (Tacke et al., 2000;
Fishman, 2014).
Furthermore, xenotransplantation has been criticized by the
scientific community due to the risk of new viral infections
with zoonotical characteristics that can infect the population
(Boneva and Folks, 2004). Viral infection from pig to human
cells, and also from xenotransplantation of baboon livers to
humans, have been reported (Allan, 1998; Denner, 2008). The
DNA of the simian foamy virus (SFV) and the baboon endoge-
nous virus (BaEV) have been observed in many tissues of
patients. The presence of baboon mitochondrial DNA (evidence
of baboon cells) suggests that baboon leukocytes may carry latent
or active viral infections (Allan, 1998). Other works suggest
that pig endogenous retrovirus (PERV) can infect culture cells
of human origin, and after completing its life-cycle in human
cells it is able to infect other human cells (Patience et al.,
1997). Because pigs present multiple copies of PERVs, breeding
PERV-free pigs is almost impossible (Boneva and Folks, 2004;
Denner and Tönjes, 2012).
Transportation of Infectious and Biological
Material
Transportation and transfer of infectious and biological materi-
als is an important biological risk and an occupational risk to
staff through improper packaging (Snyder, 2002; Kozajda et al.,
2013). There are several guidelines concerning the transport of
infectious material (World Health Organization (WHO), 1997).
Thus, shipping of biohazardmaterial within and between facilities
must be carried out with extreme care. GMOsmust be transported
in securely sealed triple package systems to avoid any escape. In
addition, the primary and secondary package must be previously
decontaminated (World Health Organization (WHO), 2012).
These units should ideally be placed within sturdy outer
shipping containers. The removal of wastes and by-products
from genetic engineering labs requires comparable packaging
and container specifications. Furthermore, pathogenic or infec-
tious microorganisms must be wholly contained inside a sealed,
unbreakable primary container (World Health Organization
(WHO), 2012). Training and education in packing and ship-
ping hazardous laboratory material is necessary for all laboratory
staff (Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories
(BMBL), 2009; World Health Organization (WHO), 2012).
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Biosafety in Research with Experimental animals
Today, research with experimental animals must be carried
out according to specific policies to guarantee their protec-
tion (Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories
(BMBL), 2009; Directive 2010/63/EU, 2010). However, their uti-
lization involving the use of hazardous biological agents also
represents an important biosafety issue. According to the potential
risk, facilities at an animal laboratory are classified into three
categories as reported by the CDC (Biosafety in Microbiological
and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL), 2009), although several
countries also present specific legislation. As previously described,
it is necessary to identify the potential hazards associated with the
animal species and the pathogens used (OIE, 2012). Moreover, it
is important to differentiate the zoonotical agents from the non-
zonootical pathogens. The first represent a potential threat to the
laboratory staff, whereas non-zoonotical pathogens, transgenic
animals, or GMOs inoculated in those animals are a threat to the
environment (Peeters, 2011). Although laboratory research with
experimental animals involves a large variety of pathogenic organ-
isms, such as bacteria, virus, parasites, or prions, among others,
reports on laboratory-acquired or zoonotical-acquired infection
are scarce. To avoid potential LAIs and/or the escape of animals
used in research, animal facilities must meet specific require-
ments. Operations with research animals must be carried out in
individually ventilated cages that guarantee isolation between ani-
mals and laboratory staff (Peeters, 2011). To improve the biosafety
of the laboratory staff, workers needs to operatewith personal pro-
tective equipment within facilities with an appropriate biosecurity
level. Moreover, in an animal facility, different types of wastes
such as feces, bedding, manure, or carcasses must be appropriately
removed and processed (Schultz, 2004).
Laboratory-Acquired Infections
The term LAIs refer to all infections acquired through labora-
tory work or laboratory-related activities with or without the
onset of infections, and result from occupational exposure to
infectious agents (Pike, 1976; Wei et al., 2011). There are only
a few reports of laboratory acquired infections and accidents
with GMOs (Kimman et al., 2008). LAIs can occur in biologi-
cal facilities such as microbiological or animal facilities during
research and investigations. In addition, the higher the biosecurity
level of the laboratory, the stronger the biosafety and biosecurity
measures are. Although LAIs and outbreaks associated with risk
group 4 are extremely rare, BSL-4 laboratories are necessary to
investigate new emerging diseases or bioterrorism threats (Nisii
et al., 2013). Identification of a laboratory outbreak is difficult, and
therefore training and education is necessary to avoid outbreaks
(Risi et al., 2010). The determination of the source of infection in
a laboratory worker can be difficult, because the etiological agent
is sometimes present in the laboratory and outside the workplace
in the population as well.
In addition, LAIs are an important issue in regard to public
health, because an infected worker could be a transmission risk
for other people. However, the literature about LAIs is quite
scarce (Pike, 1978; Traxler et al., 2013). LAIs still occur, although
comprehensive reports on LAIs are few, and based on internal
reports of the infection laboratory or by official investigation. The
underreporting of LAIs is widely acknowledged, and is ascribed
to the negative consequences for a company or authority to which
the laboratory belongs (Sewell, 1995). On the other hand, several
reports about LAIs in traditional laboratories have been published
in the recent years (Britton et al., 2011; Riyesh et al., 2014).
The most common routes of infection are inhalation (particu-
larly by aerosols), percutaneous inoculation (needlestick injuries,
broken glass injury, and/or animal bites or scratches), direct con-
tact between contaminated surfaces (gloves, hands), and mucous
membranes as well as through ingestion – for example by smok-
ing, eating, or accidental aspiration through a pipette (Kozajda
et al., 2013; Traxler et al., 2013).
The risk assessment of the potential infection of laboratory staff
must consider the route of transmission and also the minimal
infective dose for humans, which varies according to the route of
inoculation (Johnson, 2003). The increased risk for microbiology
laboratory staff that do research with zoonotical agents has long
been recognized. Although LAIs caused by pathogenic bacteria
have been described as the most common, LAIs caused by viruses
have arisen nowadays (Singh, 2011).
Brucella spp.
Brucellosis has been reported as one of the most important LAIs
(Traxler et al., 2013).
Most infections were acquired through workers being unaware
of contaminated cultures from clinical cases (Bouza et al., 2005;
Knudsen et al., 2013; Dentinger et al., 2014).
Brucellosis is still recognized as an important LAI (Knudsen
et al., 2013), and outbreaks have been mainly associated with the
improper use of the biological safety cabinets (BSC) and deficient
recognition of Brucella spp. isolated by laboratory staff (Bouza
et al., 2005; Dentinger et al., 2014). Brucella spp. belongs to risk
group Level 3. In contrast, laboratory-acquired brucellosis is not
always associated with an occupational accident but due to direct
contact, contamination of skin, splashing in the mucous mem-
branes or conjunctivae, or needlestick injuries (Kiel and Khan,
1993; Ergönül et al., 2004).
There have been reported cases of infections due to eating
and drinking near a culture-processing bench, and the lack of
individual protection equipment when handling infectious mate-
rial (Ergönül et al., 2004; Singh, 2009). Due to scarce reports
about laboratory-acquired brucellosis, it is difficult to quan-
tify (Knudsen et al., 2013) and difficult to assess, because of
a lack of surveillance and central reporting based mainly on
case reports. Unawareness of the pathogenicity of Brucella spp.
and deficient training in regard to handling biohazard materials
may contribute to new outbreaks (Sam et al., 2012). Further-
more, the low infectious dose of Brucella spp. can cause labora-
tory outbreaks that affect the laboratory staff, ranging 30–100%
(Yagupsky and Baron, 2005).
Mycobacterium tuberculosis
Early surveys of laboratory acquired tuberculosis found three to
nine times greater incidence ofMycobacterium tuberculosis among
laboratory personnel than in the general population (Singh, 2009).
However, laboratory-acquired tuberculosis is difficult to trace due
Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology | www.frontiersin.org April 2015 | Volume 3 | Article 565
Coelho and García Díez Laboratory-acquired infections in health biotechnology
to the environmental distribution of the pathogenic microorgan-
isms as well as the chronicity of infection, because infection could
happen outside of the workplace (Collins and Grange, 1999).
The greatest risk of LAI for laboratory personnel who handle M.
tuberculosis is associated with the generation of aerosols. More-
over, M. tuberculosis is also characterized by a low infective dose
for humans (Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),
2009). There are reported cases ofM. tuberculosis associated with
inadequate isolation procedures and high volumes of specimens
handled (Kao et al., 1997). To avoid possible LAI byM. tuberculo-
sis, mycobacteriamust be handled in class II or III BSC (Weinstein
and Singh, 2009).
LAIs Associated to Other Bacterial Agents
Other bacterial agents have been associated with LAIs with lower
frequency. Among them, Francisella tularensis is a zoonotical
infection, usually presented as an ulceroglandular form but also as
pneumonia. F. tularensis is characterized by its high infectivity via
aerosols and the severity of disease in humans. LAIs by F. tularen-
sis have been reported in the literature, and are more frequently
associatedwith cultures thanwith clinicalmaterial or infected ani-
mals (Shapiro and Schwartz, 2002; Singh, 2009). Since antibiotic
therapy treatment presents some adverse effects, a combination of
vaccination and correct biosafety measures has been referred to as
the most valuable control tool (Lam et al., 2012).
Enterobacteriaceae group microorganisms such as Salmonella
or Shigella have been reported as LAIs (Mermel et al., 1997; Baron
and Miller, 2008). The increasing number of antimicrobial agent-
resistant pathogens may influence these infections. Thus, other
pathogenic bacteria like Clostridium difficile, Escherichia coli, or
Klebsiella spp. have been related with LAIs (Coia, 1998; Bouza
et al., 2005).
Neisseria meningitidis
Occupationally acquired meningococcal disease is unusual; how-
ever, infection has been reported (Boutet et al., 2001; Sejvar et al.,
2005; Miller, 2012). Good laboratory practice reduces the risk of
transmission for laboratory workers (Sheets et al., 2014). Thus,
training and correct handling of cultures in safety cabinets is
fundamental because aerosol formation of isolates when working
on an open laboratory bench could be a source of infection (Sejvar
et al., 2005; Borrow et al., 2014).
In addition, laboratory personnel must use appropriate per-
sonal protective equipment andmeningococcal vaccination is rec-
ommended for staff that work with Neisseria meningitides (Sheets
et al., 2014).
Parasites
Parasitic infections have decreased in recent years. However, they
have arisen due to the globalization of trade and travel (Jenkins
et al., 2012). Because of the increased interest in parasitic diseases,
research in both human and veterinary medicine, mainly in the
context of One Health (Oura, 2014), the potential exposure to
parasites in the laboratory probably increases the risk for acquir-
ing parasitic infections. Parasitic LAIs by malaria, leishmaniasis,
trypanosomiasis, toxoplasmosis, fascioliasis, or schistosomiasis
among others have been reported (Herwaldt and Juranek, 1993;
Herwaldt, 2001; Kinoshita-Yanaga et al., 2009; Felinto de Brito
et al., 2012). The common route of parasitic LAIs has mainly
been associated with needlestick injuries, although other causes
such as barehanded work or research in the open field have also
been reported (Herwaldt, 2001). Training and education of the
laboratory staff is necessary to prevent laboratory accidents. Since
some parasitic diseases are characterized by a long asymptomatic
period, laboratory staff that work with parasites should be tested
periodically (Herwaldt, 2001). In addition, special cautions must
be taken for women of childbearing age due to the congenital
transmission characteristics of some protozoan parasites (Lopes
et al., 2012).
Virus
Today, virus research is associated with wide applications in
biotechnology, such as viral diseases, new vaccines, or GMOs. The
potential risk with virus has been previously described regard-
ing vaccine production, GMOs, or xenotransplantation. Research
about LAI via virus is scarce, although infections with human
immunodeficiency haemorrhagic virus, West Nile Virus, Dengue,
or Marburg virus, among others, have been reported (Barry et al.,
1995; Gaidamovich et al., 2000; Center for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), 2002; Britton et al., 2011; Pavlin, 2014; Wei
et al., 2014). Thus, appropriate biosafety and biosecuritymeasures,
immune control strategies, training and education, and specific
laboratory facilities are necessary to decrease the potential risk of
LAIs and/or viral outbreaks (Lipsitch and Bloom, 2012).
Lessons Learned to Apply in the Future
At regional and international levels, a number of countries have
developed and adopted biosafety guidelines for biotechnology and
bioengineering laboratories to guarantee the safety and decrease
the risk of an outbreak. Although, several biosecurity guidelines
and good laboratory practices manuals are available among these
laboratories, their recommendations and procedures are basically
the same. At international level, agencies such as WHO, FAO,
OIE, national governments and other international agencies, and
biosafety associations published biosafety manuals and guidelines
in collaboration with expert groups to assist developing countries
in the publication of their own biosafety manuals. Conferring
authority to laboratories and project supervisors is essential. Since
standards on biosafety and biosecurity vary according to the
laboratory, institution, or even among countries (Le Duc et al.,
2008; Lipsitch and Bloom, 2012), a homogenization of criteria is
necessary to avoid discrepancies. Although the three international
regulatory regimes, WHO, FAO, and OIE, have their own recom-
mendations, an integrative approach on biosafety and biosecurity
issues among them could improve the standardization of criteria
(Sture et al., 2013).
It is necessary to control the ambient conditions, and the proce-
dures practiced by laboratory staff in the manipulation of genetic
of microorganisms should be in accordance with biosafety and
biosecurity rules for personnel to avoid potential dissemination
to the environment. Identification and characterization of poten-
tial hazards related with the genetic manipulation techniques or
research for which the risks are still unknown is also necessary.
However, responsibilities are also imputed to the researchers,
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since conforming to codes of conduct and awareness of the risks
and hazards involved are their responsibility. Moreover, institu-
tions are also responsible for providing the technical and human
resources required to ensure compliance with all biosafety and
biosecurity measures (Hackney et al., 2012).
Research that involves pathogenic organisms must be carried
out in specific facilities with preventive measures and the proper
training of laboratory personnel to avoid LAIs (Fonash, 2001).
Specific training addressed to pathogenic organisms that are being
manipulated and studied must be carried out (Narasimharao,
2009). Thus, the Certification Program for Biorisk Manage-
ment Professionals proposed by the International Federation of
Biosafety Associations should be an initial step to standardize
the training and education of laboratory staff. In addition, a
proper immune control strategy for the laboratory staff should be
implemented (Rusnak et al., 2004).
To avoid occupational infections, knowledge of the application
of correct microbiological procedures and techniques and the
use of containment devices, facilities, and protective barriers is
necessary.
Most risk group 4 pathogens, including certain arenaviruses
and hendraviruses, are zoonotic agents that often cause severe
or fatal disease in infected humans (Lipsitch and Bloom, 2012).
Pathogens currently handled at biosafety level for risk group 3 and
biosafety level for risk group 4 present a serious risk to anyonewho
works in a laboratory. Laboratories with biosecurity levels for risk
group 3 and 4must conform to themost rigorous safety protocols.
Laboratory safety guidelines differ among laboratories, research
institutions, or even by country, with a high heterogeneity in
the preventive measures and training required for working on a
specific pathogen, which is a real problem in a globalized world
(Le Duc et al., 2008; Lipsitch and Bloom, 2012).
Laboratory-acquired infections are still a real threat in tra-
ditional microbiology and clinical laboratories. Reports about
biotechnology and bioengineering laboratory accidents and infec-
tions are scarce compared to traditional microbiology and clin-
ical laboratory accidents and infections (Kimman et al., 2008).
However, if the prevalence is so high in traditional microbiology
and clinical laboratories, it indicates that potential infections exist
in new technological laboratories. In the near future of genetic
science, the demand for new vaccines, antimicrobial drugs, or
treatments for emergent and re-emergent diseases will involve
new developments in biotechnology, and the risk of biological
accidents will potentially increase. Consequently, specific training
and education programs for laboratory personnel in addition
to proper design and construction of laboratory facilities must
be followed to avoid LAI and/or laboratory outbreaks (Mourya
et al., 2014). The scientific community needs to heed the lessons
learned from the past to anticipate future problems associatedwith
biological risks and LAIs.
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